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Abstract 
Lead firms operate on multiple scales and while their corporate functions may be globally 
organized, they are anchored in various territories through the formation of relations with 
local suppliers, some of whom have specialized knowledge, capabilities or technologies that 
are essential to the lead firms’ business activities. Global value chain and global production 
network analysis have recognized that financialization is increasingly driving the way in 
which lead firms coordinate their relationships with supplier firms. The contribution of this 
paper is to unpack the mechanisms that lead firms adopt to govern their supply chains in the 
context of financialization and the implications this has for the territorial embeddedness of 
lead firms. The boom-bust cycle of mining, arising from massive fluctuations in global 
commodity prices, provides a revealing context within which to explore the changing 
agendas of financial markets and their implications for lead firm connections to territory. This 
paper examines the mechanisms lead firms use to coordinate relations with local suppliers in 
the Queensland coal industry, which accounts for fifty percent of international trade in 
metallurgical coal and which has evolved in the context of the most recent boom bust cycle of 
global coal prices.  
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Lead firms in global markets operate on multiple scales and while their corporate 
functions may be globally organized, they are ‘anchored’ in various places and regions 
through the formation of relations with local suppliers, some of whom have specialized 
knowledge, capabilities or technologies that are essential to the lead firms’ business activities 
(Henderson et al. 2002; Hess 2004). The nature of connections between lead firms and local 
suppliers is influenced by lead firms’ response to the dynamics of the broader global political 
economy (Baud and Durand 2012). Global value chain (GVC) and global production network 
(GPN) analysis have recognized that financialization is increasingly driving the way in which 
local supplier firms are articulated into the global economy through relations with lead firms 
(Coe, Lai, and Wójcik 2014; Milberg 2009; Ponte and Gibbon 2005).  
The financialization of accumulation, in which profit is increasingly generated 
through financial channels (Arrighi 1994; Krippner 2005), impacts on non-financial firms 
such that corporate governance reflects the logics of financial markets, which define value in 
particular ways. In this context, shareholder value has become a driving influence on the 
organization of global production (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Montalban and Sakinç 
2013). The logic of shareholder value dictates that corporations should be run, first and 
foremost in the interests of shareholders. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) have documented 
the consequences of the rise of shareholder value with reference to the shift from the 
dominant corporate strategy of ‘retain and invest’ prior to the 1980s to the ‘downsize and 
distribute’ logic that followed from the 1980s. The effects of this logic in particular 
industries, such as pharmaceuticals, is well documented: ‘corporate managers are 
increasingly constrained by institutional shareholders to prioritize maximization of stock 
prices and returns on equity …. (resulting in) the outsourcing of business activities to 
decrease the capital employed for the same profit and refocus the firm on the most profitable 
activities to capture rents and increase ROE…”  (Montalban and Sakinç 2013, 983). 
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Outsourcing and offshoring creates intensified competition in supply chains, which combined 
with lead firm control of strategic assets at profitable points of the supply chain, enhances the 
power of global lead firms to extract price concessions from their suppliers in order to pursue 
the value logics associated with financialization (Milberg and Winkler 2013). 
The contribution of this paper is to unpack the coordination mechanisms that lead 
firms adopt to govern their supply chains in the context of financialization and the 
implications this has for lead firms’ connection with place or territorial embeddedness 
(Henderson et al. 2002; Hess 2004). Lead firms acquire their influence through industrial 
position or market power in the form of either revenue or market share (Coe and Yeung 2015, 
40) and they establish and enforce the conditions under which key economic actors, including 
their suppliers, engage with the global economy (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002). Lead firms 
coordinate their supply chains by nominating the products that should be produced, at what 
prices and how they should be delivered. This paper contributes to the increasing recognition 
in GVC and GPN approaches that financialization is a significant influence on lead firm 
governance of supply chains and relations with suppliers (Baud and Durand 2012; Coe, Lai, 
and Wójcik 2014; Milberg 2009; Ponte and Gibbon 2005). 
The mining industry provides an ideal context in which to examine the effects of lead 
firm financialization on the anchoring of lead firms in local places through the processes of 
local supply chain coordination. The landed nature of extractive industries and their 
geological characteristics would suggest that lead resource firms would be strongly anchored 
in local territories and would experience a high level of territorial embeddedness (Morris, 
Kaplinsky, and Kaplan 2012). At the same time, the resource industry is deeply financialized 
arising from heavy dependence on equity finance to support high risk mineral exploration and 
capital intensive extraction and processing. The boom-bust cycle of mining, arising from 
massive fluctuations in global commodity prices, provides a context in which to explore the 
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changing agendas of financial markets and their implications for lead firm connections to 
territory. These dynamics are examined in the context of the Queensland coal industry, which 
accounts for fifty percent of international trade in metallurgical coal (used in steel 
production) and which has evolved in the context of the boom bust cycle of global coal prices 
over the last ten years (Geological Survey of Queensland 2016). 
The following section of the paper reviews existing global value chain and global 
production network literature explaining the impact of financialization on lead firm 
territoriality and coordination of supply chains. The subsequent section draws on the 
financialization literature to unpack the territorial implications of changing lead firm 
procurement approaches including the increased emphasis on value based management and 
cost minimization. The third section explores these issues in the context of the global mining 
industry and in the specific case of the Queensland mining industry. The fourth section 
outlines the research methods. The subsequent sections explain the way in which 
financialization is driving a de-territorialization of lead firms in the Queensland mining 
industry. The paper concludes with a discussion of future research directions for economic 
geographers in relation to this work. 
 
The Impact of Financialization on Lead Firm Coordination of Production 
and Territorial Embeddedness 
Financialization is the process by which non-financial firms are driven by the logics 
of capital markets in which they seek to maximize the attractiveness of firm shares to 
investors. Investor interest is sustained by maximizing firm performance in relation to the 
predictive models of financial analysts regarding future share value (Nölke and Perry 2007; 
Williams 2000). Shareholder capitalism drives firms to increase the return on capital 
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employed (ROCE) and thereby maintain or increase dividend payments, or shareholder 
income stream, which results in positive investor assessment of investor return. Share buy-
backs are a further instrument for maximizing shareholder value because buy-backs result in 
a reduced volume of publicly traded shares resulting in an increase in the earnings of retained 
shares. Disinvestment of less profitable or low yielding parts of business is also used to 
maximize shareholder value (Montalban and Sakinç 2013, 984; Ponte and Gibbon 2005). 
Firms use divestiture to extract profits and increase dividends and repurchase stocks 
(Montalban and Sakinç, 2013, 984). Investors tend to focus on the intrinsic value of stock, as 
measured by financial analysts’ assessments of future firm performance, which heavily 
weights cash returns. There is therefore an increasing tendency for firms to deliver on the 
financial analysts’ assessment criteria by reducing costs because in many industries, price 
competition has eliminated the capacity to generate profit through price increases (Milberg 
2009).  
Financialization has important implications for territoriality of lead firms, or the way 
in which lead firms organize their global production activities. First, off-shoring, or the 
globalization of supply chains, has facilitated the concentration of economic assets in lead 
firms by expanding their revenue base, which has enabled them to secure additional strategic 
assets including technology, human resources, forms of production organization, intellectual 
property and marketing and design, which form barriers to entry for competitor firms. These 
strategic assets underpin “super profits premised on the existence of barriers to entry” 
(Kaplinsky 2004, 7). Only globalized financialized firms, with high market capitalization, 
have the resources to secure these strategic assets. Lead firms are “those that drive global 
production networks and make things happen. Their ability to do so depends on their 
asymmetric control and internalization of key resources” (Coe and Yeung 2015, 65). The 
global reorganization of production has been critical for lead firms to secure strategic assets 
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and positions of market power that enable them to deliver shareholder value and sustain 
investor interest. The processes of financialization and globalization are therefore intimately 
entwined (Baud and Durand 2012). 
Second, globalization has enabled lead firms to increase competition within supply 
chains through global sourcing across multiple territories. The resulting competitive pressures 
amongst suppliers has enabled lead firms to drive cost reductions along their supply chain. 
Essentially, lead firms have derived operational advantages, including reduced input costs, at 
the expense of supply chain firms, because of their increased market power arising from 
globalization (Baud and Durand 2012; Montalban and Sakinç 2013). Milberg and Winkler 
(2013) show that the management of GPNs has been a critical component of corporate 
strategy to capture rents from oligopolistic power. Offshoring of production activities has 
therefore resulted in forms of economic organization in global production networks 
characterized by oligopolistic lead firms and highly fragmented and competitive supplier 
networks. Asymmetrical market structures and associated practices of off-shoring have 
enabled US firms to increase their mark-up and profit share (Milberg and Winkler 2013). 
Lead firms utilize offshoring as an instrument for cost reduction creating new sources of 
profits, which enable them to deliver on financial market imperatives. 
The effect of these trends is demonstrated by Foster and McChesney (2012). Large 
multinational firms have diversified across nations and industry sectors, such that the 
concentration (through capital accumulation) and centralization (through mergers and 
acquisitions) of economic activity far exceeds that which prevailed in the immediate post-
World War II era.  The total gross profit share of the top two hundred US Corporations as a 
percentage of total business profits in the US economy more than doubled between 1950 and 
the mid-2000s (Foster and McChesney 2012, 71). As Foster and McChesney (2012) argue, 
“the capacity of the giant firms in the economy to obtain higher profits than their smaller 
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competitors is the main indicator of the degree of monopoly exercised by these mega 
corporations” (p. 71).  Vitali, Glattfelder, and Battison (2011) have shown that a core group 
of 147 MNCs control almost 40 percent of the economic value of the world’s population of 
MNCs (cited in Coe et al. 2014, 765). 
The effects of the changing nature of lead firm territoriality and coordination of 
supply chains in the context of financialization is further explained by Mahutga (2014), who 
shows that lead firms in sectors such as apparel establish massive advertising budgets to 
sustain brand power, which creates barriers to entry and enables high levels of concentration 
amongst buyers. Only large MNCs with significant capital to invest in developing and 
maintaining brand image are able to secure a position in the highly profitable buyer nodes 
within global retain chains. Buyers are able to exert downward pressure on price in 
negotiations with the large number of competing suppliers who have relatively few 
alternatives. In producer-driven chains such as transport equipment, the main resources of 
lead firms are “highly capitalized and technologically advanced production facilities as well 
as knowledge and technology intensive R&D operations”, which create barriers to entry at 
the production point of the GVC and enable producers to put downward pressure on price in 
their transactions with suppliers (p. 166).  
Financialization drives lead firms to maximize returns on equity and distribute value 
to shareholders. Globalization has been an essential strategy for lead firms to reduce their 
direct involvement in production through increased outsourcing and to decrease their input 
costs by increasing global competition along their supply chains. “Such reorganization frees 
up financial resources to increase share buybacks and dividends in order to satisfy 
shareholders” (Baud and Durand 2012, 241). The resulting profits are used to meet the 
demands of shareholder value (Milberg and Winkler 2013). Financialization is therefore 
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affecting the organization of global production and the territorial dimensions of lead firm 
strategy.  
 
The Mechanisms of Coordination and their Territorial Implications  
Financialization is influencing the ways in which lead firms establish the conditions under 
which suppliers participate in global markets (Gibbon 2002). Procurement arrangements have 
become a key mechanism for lead firms to coordinate their supply chains to deliver the 
demands of shareholder value creation. Procurement is the process of vetting or selecting 
suppliers of good and services, which might involve competitive bidding between suppliers, 
the establishment of the principles under which supply will operate (including payment terms 
and delivery times) and the negotiation of contracts for the purchase of goods and services. 
Building on Cushen and Thompson (2016), the following  discussion elaborates on the way 
in which financialization is affecting procurement arrangements, through the growing 
emphasis on value based management and cost minimization, and the implications this has 
for the territorial embeddedness of lead firms. 
 
Value Based Management 
Financialization influences the behavior of lead firms in global markets by 
encouraging the adoption of value based management approaches that utilize formalistic 
metric based calculations in management decision making. This affects global suppliers by 
driving standards and evaluation criteria in procurement processes. Financialization has led to 
strengthened forms of value based control in procurement arrangements, which are necessary 
to meet the demands of metrics driven ratings agencies and investment intermediaries.  
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“Value based management (VBM) refers to tools that financial managers can use to 
plan, monitor, and control a firm's operations in ways that enhance shareholder value” 
(Martin and Petty 2001) leading to the adoption of financial models of evaluation and control 
both within the firm and in relations within supply chains. Accounting standards promote a 
form of value based calculation in firm decision making that elevates quantitative and 
formalistic metrics over strategic decision making (or longer term market positioning). 
Metrics, scoreboards and rankings underpin a logic of formal rationality in engagement with 
suppliers, focused not on end goals, but on mechanistic evaluation of closed criteria (Froud et 
al. 2000).   
These conventions or norms for measuring and evaluating value are established 
through international accounting standards. While previously accounting practice utilized a 
historical cost accounting approach in assessing value, in which an asset value was gauged 
relative to its purchase price, accounting standards have shifted to focus on what is described 
as ‘fair-value accounting’ (Nölke and Perry 2007) in which an asset’s performance is defined 
with reference to expected future income streams or “in other words, simulating what a 
rational market participant would do” (Perry and Nölke 2006). These market participants are 
the credit rating agencies and intermediaries that control large investment funds, pensions and 
the investment divisions of international banks who have been given an elevated influence 
over managerial decision making through the adoption of these new accounting codes. 
Value based management is designed to ensure the adoption of these standards as key 
decision making influences within the firm. Consultancy firms that sell their shareholder 
value creation products to corporate managers, emphasize the importance of implementation 
and incentive packages that ensure that value becomes a universal language across all 
corporate functions (Froud et al. 2000), including and essentially within procurement 
divisions that manage supply chain relations.  
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Cost Minimization 
Financialization has also resulted in an emphasis on cost minimization in 
procurement, which has been an important mechanism for lead firms to capture rents from 
their control of strategic assets, which is necessary to deliver on the demand of financial 
markets to maximize shareholder return. The prioritization of cost minimization is being 
achieved through outsourcing and offshoring, which enhance competition in the supply base 
and enable lead firms to exert downward pressure on costs through global procurement of 
products and services (Baud and Durand 2012; Milberg 2009). 
Milberg (2009) shows that import price deflation is a characteristic of highly 
developed global value chains in which there are high levels of offshoring and supplier 
competition, documenting import price declines of a magnitude of 40 percent in the 20 years 
up to 2006 in clothing, footwear, textiles, furniture, chemicals. Essentially, these are highly 
saturated product markets in which lead firms occupy oligopolistic power. “From the lead-
firm perspective, excess capacity and the steady arrival of new entrants in supplier markets 
serve the purpose both of cost reduction and of greater flexibility” (with the possibility of 
multiple suppliers facilitated by globalization) (Milberg 2009, 433).  
Baud and Durand (2012, 14) explain the increasing returns on equity in the retail 
sector at a time of declining domestic market growth with reference to the success of retailers 
in sustaining market ups through cost reductions imposed on workers and suppliers through 
global procurement arrangements. The adoption of IT systems and logistics arrangements 
enables retailers to better monitor and control the supply chain through procurement 
processes. Suppliers have had to increase their volume and pace of delivery in order to secure 
their continuing position in the global supply network.  
Territorial Embeddedness  
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Procurement has become a mechanism for lead firms to shape access to global 
markets in ways that prioritize the agenda of shareholder value – by implementing the logic 
of value based management through the establishment of a limited range of metrics based 
criteria that emphasize cost minimization. The relationship between lead firms and local 
suppliers, and in particular their territorial embeddedness, or extent to which lead firms 
depend on local suppliers, would appear to be related to the forms of coordination adopted by 
lead firms in the context of the broader dynamics of the global production network, including 
financialization. 
Territorial embeddedness refers to the extent to which lead firms are committed to or 
‘anchored’ in specific territories or places (Hess 2004). Lead firms are heavily embedded in 
particular regional locations when they become intensely reliant on or constrained by the 
institutional, social or economic characteristics of the region, for example by forming 
dependent relations with local suppliers who provide unique and difficult to access resources 
to the lead firms.  In this way, local firms articulate into global markets through their relations 
with lead firms and benefit from access to global market opportunities (Amin and Thrift 
1994; Ernst and Kim 2002; Humphrey and Schmitz 2002).  
When the ability to codify information exchanged in an economic transaction is low, 
lead firms have relied on forms of coordination that involve high levels of territorial 
embeddedness. Trust based social relations have been the necessary mechanism to avoid the 
opportunistic behaviors that are possible when transactions involve the exchange of complex 
design information, non-standard inputs and integrated product design architectures 
(Sturgeon 2009). Geographically co-located buyers and highly competent suppliers engage in 
sustained relationships underpinned by trust, reputation and tacit knowledge exchange, such 
as those identified in segments of the fresh produce and apparel chains (Gereffi, Humphrey, 
and Sturgeon 2005). Territorially embedded firms rely on coordination through reputation 
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and social relations as Uzzi’s analysis of the New York garment industry illustrates (Uzzi 
1997), suggesting that local relations and face to face knowledge exchange are likely to be 
involved in this form of coordination. This approach adopts a highly territorialized 
conception of embeddedness (Amin and Thrift 1994) in which proximity is attributed a 
significant role in creating trust amongst economic partners (Hess 2004). 
However, financialization incentivizes lead firms to develop ‘hands-off’ forms of 
coordination, which enable them to prioritize shareholder value and which result in the de-
territorialization of lead firms. Codification, through the development of standards or 
conventions, such as those associated with value based management, facilitates a global 
approach to sourcing, which does not require lead firms to be anchored in particular 
territories, thereby enabling lead firms to rupture relations with local suppliers (Ponte and 
Gibbon 2005). 
This allows lead firms to develop what Ponte and Gibbon (2005) have described as 
‘arms-length’ or ‘hands-off’ coordination of supply chain relations. ‘Hands-off’ coordination 
of supply chains involves an outsourcing of non-core functions, emphasis on short-term 
returns in supplier relations, ‘playing’ with the possibility of switching partners by 
establishing competitive tendering processes and creating competition within the supply base 
to gain status as ‘preferred supplier’ (Ponte and Gibbon 2005, 20). ‘Hands-off’ forms of 
coordination break down the connection between lead firms and place associated with deeper 
and longer term relations with trusted suppliers.  
The Impact of Financialization on Lead Firm Coordination of Production 
and Territorial Embeddedness in the Global Mining Industry 
The financialization and globalization of the mining industry have impacted on the 
way in which mining firms coordinate their supply chains and the extent to which lead firms 
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form close relations with specialized suppliers in local places. The materiality of mining (and 
other resource extraction industries) arises from the ‘landed’ nature of extractive assets 
suggesting a particularly local and place based nature of production. Geology, or variations in 
resource quality (the ease of access and quality of ore bodies), implies that the global 
distribution of mining activity will be determined by nature rather than strategic or 
organizational intention (Bridge 2009). It might also be expected that lead firms in the 
resources industry would coordinate their supply chains through close relations with local 
suppliers, given that the nature, quality and location of bedrock varies by site and requires 
specialist local expertise or equipment in extraction and processing (Morris, Kaplinsky, and 
Kaplan 2012). However, in mining enclaves, lead firms establish weak productive linkages 
with the local economy, rely heavily on suppliers outside the local region, and contribute 
little to the development of productive activities beyond narrow paths of industrialization 
(Arias, Atienza, and Cademartori 2014; Phelps, Atienza, and Arias 2015).   
The way in which local firms are articulated into global production networks is 
impacted by the extent of globalization and financialization of the mining industry which 
have led to a heavy concentration of economic assets. As firms in mining and metals are 
capital intensive, they have depended on equity markets to support high risk exploration and 
mineral project development and this has led to a concentration of capital at the mining 
exploitation stage of the global value chain.   
An indication of the growing financialization and globalization of the mining and 
metals industry, market capitalization  had reached record levels by 2010. The minimum 
market capitalization of the top 40 firms in 2010 was US11bn, significantly higher than the 
$6.5bn required to enter the top 40 in 2009 (PWC 2011). In addition to the substantial growth 
in the stock value of the top forty, there was also considerable concentration in the industry 
globally. BHP Billiton, Vale and Rio Tinto market capitalization was significantly higher 
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than other global miners. Rio Tinto, the smallest of the top three, had a market capitalization 
twice the level of China’s Shenhua which sat at fourth place. The top three companies by 
revenue represented 36% of total revenues of the top 40 global miners in 2010 (PWC 2011).  
 
Although geology plays an important part in the place based distribution of mining 
production and lead firm relations with suppliers, global competition between resource 
endowed regions has intensified from the 1990s as more nations sought to attract foreign 
investment through market liberalization and clarification of principles of land tenure. The 
globalization of mining production is demonstrated by the shifting partners of global 
investment activity. The share of mining investment in North American and Australasia 
declined by half to 25 % of worldwide flows in 2000, from a starting point of 50% of 
worldwide flows at the beginning of the 1990s (Bridge 2004). Lead firms have significantly 
expanded their regional investment options during this period. In addition, the boom bust 
cycle of commodity prices renders production a function of global market conditions and not 
just geological possibilities. As with other industries, the globalization of mining production 
has resulted in intensified competition between mining regions and in the supply chain 
(Bridge 2004). 
Methods 
This paper is focused on the case of the Queensland mining industry which accounts 
for 7.3 percent of gross product and fifty-nine percent of the State’s exports. Coal is a 
particularly important commodity. Queensland accounts for fifty percent of international 
trade and one eighth of global production in metallurgical coal (coking coal used in iron and 
steel making) and fifteen percent of internationally traded thermal coal (used in energy 
production). Coal production taking place in 2015 occurred in 41 open-cut and 13 
 15 
underground mines.  After coal, base metals are the most significant sector in Queensland’s 
mining industry including bauxite, copper, gold, zinc, lead, silver (Geological Survey of 
Queensland 2016).  
The mining equipment, technology and services sector are the major group of local 
supplier firms that form relations in upstream mining with the lead firms. As METS firms’ 
activities do not map on to standard industry classifications, no national representation of the 
sector size, composition and activities is available. Austmine, the major national industry 
association representing the METS sector, has reported that there are around 149 METS firms 
in Queensland for whom mining firms are their major customers and eighty-five percent of 
these firms have some involvement in coal. The bulk of these firms (85.9 percent) are 
majority Australian owned. While just over fifty percent of METS firms in Queensland are 
involved in exporting, very few earn more than twenty percent of their revenue from exports 
and are instead very heavily dependent on relations with local lead firms (Austmine 2013).  
We utilized two main data sources for this research. The first was the major financial 
newspaper in Australia, the Australian Financial Review (AFR), which reports market trends. 
The AFR was used as an information resource on corporate activity and market trends and 
was searched through the digital database Factiva. Other publicly available resources 
produced by major consultancy organizations that track mining industry trends and public 
institutions such as the Australian Securities Exchange and the Reserve Bank of Australia 
were also utilized and are cited below. The information obtained from these sources was used 
to track major corporate developments and obtain data on industry concentration and 
capitalization.  
The second source of data was thirty-seven semi-structured interviews in Brisbane, 
Queensland. Thirty-four interviews were conducted with firm managers of firms of a variety 
of different sizes for whom the mining industry is their major customer or sector of operation. 
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Of the thirty-four firm interviews, one was with a mining industry investment firm, four were 
with the CEO/CFO or procurement manager of mining firms and two were with procurement 
managers from Engineering, Procurement and Construction Management (EPCM) firms. The 
remaining twenty-seven interviews were conducted with supplier firms in the mining and 
engineering technology sector (METS).  In addition to the thirty-four firm interviews, three 
interviews were conducted with industry experts: one from a mining focused research 
institution with investment experience and two from government.  
Interview questions focused on the nature of the relationships between Australian 
METS firms and their customers, how firms ‘win work’ locally and globally, how firms 
negotiate to capture revenue for their product/service, firm capabilities and technologies, and 
the competitive strengths and weaknesses of the METS sector. Once we achieved a high 
convergence of responses we ceased interviews (Corbin and Strauss 1990). Interviews were 
coded thematically (Corbin and Strauss 1990; Glaser and Strauss 1967). This paper focuses 
on themes that emerged from the data around cost minimization and value based logics in 
procurement processes. 
 
Financialization in the Queensland Mining Industry 
The Queensland mining industry reflects the broader trends associated with 
financialization and globalization of production. The lead firms in Queensland’s mining 
industry have always been global multinational corporations. The Queensland coal industry, 
which is at the core of Queensland mining, developed in the 1950s and 1906s, primarily 
through the activities of the USA firm, Utah Construction Company. Between 1967 and 
1972, Utah Construction Company developed four mines, a rail link and a port facility in 
Queensland. By 1981, they owned a majority share in six mines and produced 50 percent of 
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the state’s coal production (Resource Information Unit 1984). Galligan (1989, 28) shows that 
over a twenty year period between 1965 and 1985, Utah produced sixty six percent of 
Queensland coal exports (Galligan 1989, 28).  
Although Utah was a global company whose American shareholders massively 
benefited from the 1970s growth of the Japanese economy and the OPEC oil crisis, 
Queensland was a central component of Utah’s global business, accounting for ninety percent 
of the firm’s profits throughout the 1970s. As a result, Utah was heavily embedded in 
Queensland as a place, many of its employees had been with the firm for a ‘professional 
lifetime’ and significant autonomy rested with the local Australian managers of Utah 
operations who built close relations with the engineering professional community. In 
addition, the profits generated by Utah throughout the 1970s followed two decades in which 
the Australian operations of Utah operated at a small loss, suggesting the company did not 
adopt a short-term orientation in its connection to Queensland based mining operations 
(Galligan 1989).  
By 1981, Queensland had around 25 operating coal mines. Utah had a majority share 
of six mines and produced 50 percent of the State’s coal. The second largest firm was BHP 
Minerals with a majority share in 4 mines. In 1984, the Australian listed company BHP 
acquired Utah Development. The acquisition of Utah by BHP provided BHP with access to 
Utah’s portfolio of global assets and was a central component of BHPs strategy to transition 
from ‘the Big Australian’ to a ‘major world minerals player’ (Marcus 2000, 16D). BHP’s 
transition in the 1980s coincided with broader global processes of internationalization of 
production and financialization depicted above (Milberg and Winkler 2013). At that point, 
BHP became a truly global company as it extended BHP’s operations into the USA, Brazil, 
Canada and Chile. The financialization of BHP follows the pattern of financialization of other 
major global corporations from the 1980s (Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013).  
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At the same time, between 1980 and 2010, the volume of coal production in 
Queensland massively increased (from 34.7 Mt to 206.6 Mt). Throughout the period, coal 
production was heavily concentrated. By 2010, it was BHP and Rio Tinto that were engaged 
in the highest volume of coal production, accounting for almost half of Queensland coal 
production.  By 2013, there were 58 coal mining operations in Queensland. BHP Billiton (in 
partnership with Mitsubishi Alliance and BHP Mitsui Coal) is the largest miner with 11 
mining operations. Anglo American, Glencore and Rio Tinto together with BHP Billiton 
account for two thirds of the coal mined in the state (Resource Information Unit 2012).  
The financialization and structural power of lead firms is demonstrated by their level 
of market capitalization. The top five companies by market capitalization account for over 
75% of the market value of mining and metals firms listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) and of particular importance, BHP Billiton alone accounts for almost 50% 
of the market value of the top 100 firms in the sector and BHP and Rio together account for 
around 60 percent of the market value of ASX top 100 firms in mining and metals (ASX, 
2013).    
The lead firms, the mining ‘Majors’, have the financial capacity to secure the highest 
yielding ore bodies, which are the basis of rents in commodity based industries (Morris, 
Kaplinsky, and Kaplan 2012), ensuring that they are positioned at the most profitable points 
of the value chain. Their competitors control lower yielding ore bodies that are more difficult 
to mine and are therefore less profitable and more vulnerable to commodity price declines.   
The logics of shareholder value have been a key feature of senior management’s 
decision making in the lead firms. The influence of shareholder value principles became 
particularly apparent after the commodity price collapse. From its peak at the end of 2011, 
the contract price for thermal coal fell by 44 percent by mid-2013. As was reported in… 
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“More than 10,400 jobs have been lost in the Australian coal industry since the 
middle of 2012. Last week, Anglo-American boss Mark Cutifani said the outlook for 
the industry was ‘grim’. This followed a comment by former Macarthur Coal 
chairman, Keith De Lacy that the industry was in crisis” (Glasgow 2013). 
In 2013, Rio Tinto was put on a negative credit watch by Standard and Poors. The 
major financial paper in Australia, The Australian Financial Review, argued on 2 April 2013 
that mining companies need to “rebuild the case for why investors should buy their shares”. 
The financial papers and financial markets reported that the CEOs of BHP and Rio Tinto had 
not responded quickly enough to the changed environment in 2012 and by the beginning of 
2013 they were removed from office: 
“Rio Tinto chief executive Tom Albanese and BHP Billiton chief executive Marius 
Kloppers were removed from their jobs in January and February respectively. They 
were replaced by a new set of executives who wasted no time reinforcing the new 
paradigm: cost cuts, a reduction in capital expenditure and the sale of non-core assets 
to bolster the balance sheet” (Hobbs 2013).  
 
In 2014, PWC reported that the top 40 mining companies globally (by market 
capitalization) had a 72 percent (or $52 billion) fall in net profits to $20bn, the lowest it had 
been for a decade (PWC 2014, 7). However: 
“despite the difficult year, the industry’s focus on rewarding shareholders continued 
during 2013. The top 40 listened to their shareholders by reigning in spending but 
maintaining their track record of paying dividends” (p. 13) 
 
As a consequence, the dividend pay-out ratio (measured by dividends divided by 
adjusted net profits) increased from 40 percent in 2012 to 95 percent in 2013. The dividend 
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payments were highly concentrated, with the top five companies paying 50 percent of the 
value of total dividends paid by the top 40 companies. In order to sustain this level of 
dividend payments, with declining profits, companies have had to use retained earnings and 
in some cases debt (PWC 2014).  
 
The mechanisms by which financialization is driving the de-
territorialization of lead firms in the Queensland mining industry 
Lead firms in the Queensland mining industry have established the principles under 
which their suppliers participate in the mining global supply chain. As the lead mining firms 
in Queensland continued to sustain their dividend payouts to shareholders in the competition 
for investor funds, they also drove financialized logics in their value chain relationships. The 
following discussion outlines the way in which financialization is affecting procurement 
arrangements adopted by lead firms in coordinating their mining supply chains, through the 
growing emphasis on value based management and cost minimization, and the way in which 
these financialized logics have worked in conjunction with the globalized nature of mining 
activities to rupture relations with local suppliers and the territorial embeddedness of lead 
firms.  
Value Based Management 
Value based control mechanisms have been implemented through the strengthening of 
procurement divisions within the lead firms and a commitment to value metrics as the basis 
for decision making. These are important mechanisms through which financialized value 
logics play out in the global production network and encourage a disarticulation of local 
suppliers from global productions. In order to drive financialized agendas along the value 
chain, lead firms are seeking to rupture relations between mine site managers and local 
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suppliers by adopting centralized procurement arrangements which incorporate the 
normalized logics of financial markets as the basis for decision making. Through the use of 
the conventions of value based management (Ponte and Gibbon 2005), lead firms are able to 
use corporate head office to drive financialized agendas in relations with suppliers and break 
the deeper, longer term relations between mine site managers and local engineering and 
technology suppliers. 
Significant resources are being invested in the struggle for control of the value chain 
through the employment of procurement management teams that drive hands-off formalistic 
decision making processes in value chain relationships. Procurement managers are typically 
located in central divisions of the firm and represent a different approach to engaging 
suppliers than would typically occur at the mine-site where mine-site managers (usually 
engineers) form direct and often long term relationships with suppliers. The strengthening of 
procurement management control over the global value chain enables the Majors to deliver 
on the tough value metrics designed to reduce capital expenditure and costs (see below). This 
is shown in the very influential role of procurement managers within the firm and in driving 
value chain relationships.  
It is not just the Majors that are enriching procurement divisions, the practice is 
extending down the value chain to Tier 1 suppliers that are often responsible for procurement 
and operation of the Majors’ mines. An Engineering Procurement and Construction 
Management (EPCM) firm (a Tier 1 Supplier to the Majors) reported that they are in the 
process of recruiting fifty procurement managers who will be ‘category managers’ for 
procurement, which “will take a lot of the responsibility away from the guys who are in the 
field making decisions and bring it back to a center-led team” (METS 435, 6). The aim has 
been to ensure that mine-site managers, typically engineers, are not able to control value 
chain relationships. As the procurement managers themselves report, the growing influence 
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of procurement divisions is to ensure that “we will have 100 percent control over where 
people buy from” (METS 435, 10). 
Procurement divisions, which are driving a centralization of decision making 
regarding which suppliers the firm engage with and on what conditions, were highly critical 
of the role played by mine-site managers in managing relations with suppliers. Procurement 
managers were dismissive of the suggestion that mine-site managers used engineering 
expertise and knowledge of particular mine site conditions as a basis for their decision 
making. Instead, procurement managers suggested that mine-site managers simply awarded 
work to ‘their mates’ (with whom they had long term relationships), whereas procurement 
divisions used technical, rational and objective criteria as the basis for decision making 
(METS 435, 8). The aim of procurement was to break the social relations that were believed 
to underpin the way in which mine-site engineers managed value chain relations. 
The nature of the procurement process is such that in order to progress through the 
first stage, supplier firms need to demonstrate that they have the capability to deliver. 
However, once they are deemed to meet the minimum capability requirements, cost is the 
driver, not relative levels of capability. In this environment, METS firms find it harder to 
‘sell’ the value of their product because its value is not captured by the limited codification 
achieved through the procurement framework. The process was explained in the same way by 
a METS firm:  
“The first question is: are they technically capable of doing the job, and then 
that’s the technical side of things taken care of so that the project engineer may be 
taken off - or the project manager may be taken out of the discussion at that stage and 
it just purely becomes a procurement exercise of - well out of these three technically 
capable providers who’s the cheapest?” (GMETS 415, 27-28).  
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At this point, the project manager (engineer) might want to recruit a supplier whom 
they trust and know to be flexible and capable of dealing with any changes that might 
develop during the project, even though their preferred supplier might cost a little more. But 
“procurement say no: your role in this assessment is to determine whether the company 
and/or its technology are capable of doing the project, yes or no?”. Once the project 
manager/mine site manager has deemed a supplier to be technically capable against the 
specifications of the activity, then the role of the mine site manager ends and their input into 
decision making is finished (GMETS 415, 27-28). In this way, the influence of social 
relations between local mine-site managers and local suppliers in the procurement process is 
minimized and the articulation of local suppliers into global production networks is ruptured 
by the formalistic criteria of procurement.  The adoption of ‘hands-off’ coordination of the 
supply chain contrasts with deeper longer-term relations associated with relational forms of 
coordination (Gibbon, Bair, and Ponte 2008).  
Cost minimization 
In addition to disrupting local relations between lead firms and suppliers, the 
strengthening of value based management approaches in the procurement divisions of the 
mining Majors is designed to facilitate and enhance a global approach to supplier relations, 
which enables lead firms to prioritize cost minimization by intensifying global competition 
between suppliers.  Following the commodity price collapse, in which mining Majors were 
no longer able to profit through commodity price increases (or revenue growth), the 
financialized logics shifted from increasing the numerator (revenue) to reducing the 
denominator (costs). Rio Tinto reported to the market that it had developed a “greater focus 
on value”. Glyn Lawcock, UBS analyst, noted that Rio’s “new mantra is value over volume” 
(Saunders AFR, 17-18 October 2015). In July 2014, BHP announced it would “remain 
focused on value over volume”.  
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When the main priority of the lead firms was volume, they drew heavily on close 
relations with local suppliers to assist them in increasing capacity to maximize extraction. 
During the period of high and growing coal prices, the large miners were in an investment 
phase of their operations and their aim was to extract coal as fast as possible.  Local suppliers 
benefited with increased activity and prices (AIM433, 16). Following the boom, the lead 
firms severed relations with local suppliers and reoriented decision making towards cost 
reduction.  
During this period, independent miners, not subject to stock market pressures, adopted 
a different approach. They sought to manage their business by trying to: 
“keep an even keel through the good times and the bad rather than stressing 
the business by going up and down with the market at that time. … keeping that even 
keel is linked to long-term relationships. It’s linked to not screwing the contractors to 
death just because you can” (AIM433, 17).  
In contrast to the independents, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto have competed to become 
the world’s lowest cost exporters to China. The intensified competition to demonstrate to 
investors lead firm status in terms of cost reduction has resulted in “both miners driving their 
costs lower” (Saunders AFR, 7 Sep 2015). The aim has been for the lead firms to ensure that 
they have low ‘break-evens’ per tonne, sitting below the existing and projected commodity 
prices per tonne. Factors contributing to break-evens, such as the distance of mines from the 
coast/ports, have been beyond the miners’ control. However, “cash costs – the key 
component of a miner’s break-even that it can control – have not been at such low levels for 
Rio or BHP since 2004” (Saunders AFR, 7 Sep 2015).  In February 2014 – BHP announced it 
was aiming for an average 20 percent return rate from investments, resulting in intensified 
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internal competition for capital. The 20 percent target is an increase on the 15 percent target 
which had prevailed 18 months earlier (Macdonald-Smith AFR, 19 Feb 2014).   
As prices decline, the Majors have sought to satisfy shareholders by maintaining their 
earnings through control of costs and investments. This has been achieved through the 
imposition of restrictive ROI requirements, which displace mission oriented strategic 
decision making processes. Value metrics and scoreboards, rather than strategic growth 
oriented agendas, have driven decision making. At the same time as using value metrics to set 
targets for cutting capital expenditure, mining companies worked hard to slash costs through 
the imposition of blanket cost calculations. Rio Tinto had a cost reduction target of $2bn for 
2013 which it exceeded by 15% while BHP Billiton had a target efficiency savings totaling 
$5.5bn through 2014 (PWC 2014, 25).  
 
The imposition of value based control through the Majors’ procurement teams has 
played a critical role in the cost-cutting drive. As a METS CEO who had previously worked 
in a Major Mining firm reported: 
“I think these days they are taught how to handle suppliers and they are taught 
to really drive the price down” (METS 402, 12). 
As a METS supplier explained, procurement is not really used to select between 
customers; it is used to drive price down: 
“So the interesting thing is 85 per cent of jobs are won by the incumbent, so 
the customer already knows who they’re going to pretty much pick before they even 
go to tender.  The role of procurement is to … get a dollar saved. That’s the KPI for a 
procurement group typically” (METS, 26). 
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Discussion 
Financialization involves an increasing influence of principles of shareholder value in 
the strategic behaviors of non-financial firms. Lead firms are thereby driven by the desire to 
maximize the attractiveness of firm shares to investors through share buy-backs, dividend 
payments and increases in the return on capital employed (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000).  
The GVC and GPN literature has shown that financialization has important territorial 
implications because it has been accompanied by the related process of globalization or off-
shoring, which has facilitated the concentration of highly valuable economic assets in lead 
firms, enabling lead firms to meet the demands of shareholder value while also maximizing 
competition in the supply base (Milberg 2009; Milberg and Winkler 2013). The resulting 
asymmetrical market structures allows lead firms to drive financialization agendas in their 
supply chains (Baud and Durand 2011, Montalban and Sakinç 2013). 
Lead firms in the Queensland coal industry have always benefited from significant 
market power in the form of high market share and the capacity to generate rents, as 
explained by Kaplinsky (2004), arising from their control of strategic assets in the form of 
high yielding ore bodies. During the period in which Utah was the lead firm in the 
Queensland coal industry, significant autonomy rested with local engineers who were well 
connected with the local engineering professional community. After the acquisition of Utah 
in the mid-1980s, BHP and the other mining majors became increasingly global in their 
operations, in line with the opening up of mining and resources opportunities across the globe 
and the global fragmentation of mining production (Bridge 2004). As mining is a high capital 
intensity and high risk industry, there is a heavy dependence on equity financing, and lead 
mining firms in Queensland followed the pattern of other multinational firms in become 
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increasingly financialized and subject to the discipline of shareholder value from the 1980s 
(Milberg and Winkler 2013).  
As Milberg and Winkler (2013) have argued, the coordination of value chain 
relationships needs to be understood in the context of the changing global production and 
financialization of lead firms. The changing priorities of financial markets can be observed in 
lead firms’ relations with suppliers during the massive growth of the Queensland coal 
industry following the commodity price boom of the late 2000s. In the initial stages of the 
boom, the priority of financial markets and the lead firms was to maximize production as fast 
as possible to satisfy growing global demand, particularly for metallurgical coal used in steel 
production. Significant autonomy rested with local mine site managers, who relied heavily on 
local suppliers, in order to achieve a fast upscaling of extraction and processing. As volume 
became the main focus of corporate managers, little regard was given to cost increases, which 
could easily be borne with the sudden and dramatic growth in global prices for metallurgical 
coal.  Lead firms adopted relational approaches to value chain coordination (Gereffi, 
Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005), which depended on close personal relations between mine 
site managers and local suppliers. The commodity price spike enabled lead firms to deliver 
shareholder value, even in the context of rapidly rising prices within the supply chain. 
Following the collapse of the coal price between 2011 and 2013, financial markets 
shifted their agenda to cost control.  Lead firms adopted “hands off coordination” of their 
supply chain, involving standards for supply chain procurement that displaced relational 
forms of coordination (Ponte and Gibbon 2005). The intensified focus on value and global 
sourcing in procurement processes lead to a rupture of relations with local suppliers. The 
majors centralized procurement activity within the firm in order to reduce the influence of 
local mine site managers in the procurement process and to break down the decentralized 
approach, which was blamed for having driven up costs. Relations between mine site 
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managers and local suppliers were disrupted by the centralized approached to procurement, 
which enabled the majors to draw on their corporate power and concentrated mining assets to 
drive cost reductions down the value chain.  Mining firms faced significant downward 
pressure on stock value and readily responded to the demands to ‘reign in costs’ with 
significant implications for their relations with local suppliers. 
In the context of the mining industry, the intensified use of centralized procurement 
became a key mechanism for delivering value based management agendas and cost 
minimization. Financialization encouraged the adoption of metric based calculation in supply 
chain relations in alignment with the formal rationality and mechanistic evaluation of closed 
criteria preferred by investors and fund managers (Froud et al. 2000; Nölke and Perry 2007). 
An intensified emphasis on cost minimization in supply chain relations was a further 
consequence of mounting financialization pressures following the boom, such that lead firms 
sought to impose cost reduction on suppliers in order to retain sufficient earnings to continue 
to deliver dividends to shareholders in the context of declining global commodity prices 
(Baud and Durand 2012; Ponte and Gibbon 2005).  
Financialization drove hands-off coordination of supply chains following the 
commodity price collapse in ways that encouraged a disembedding of lead firms from local 
territories (Hess 2004) through the severance of local relations between mine site managers 
and local suppliers. However, the behavior of lead firms in the mining industry during the 
boom demonstrates that financialization does not inevitably drive cost minimization and 
hands-off value based management approaches with suppliers. In the boom time, the super 
profits which arose in the mining industry facilitated a decentralized approach enabling mine 
site managers to rapidly scale up production through the use of local suppliers and with little 
regard to the cost effects, which were readily absorbed by the commodity price spike.  
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Financialization has territorial implications, because it affects the mechanisms lead 
firms adopt to coordinate their supplier networks, which in turn affects lead firms’ connection 
with territory and the articulation and disarticulation of local suppliers from global production 
(Coe and Yeung 2015). While financialization appears to be broadly driving a lead firm 
agenda of disarticulation from place, it is not unidirectional and at least in the case of mining, 
with its boom bust cycle, the extent of articulation of local suppliers in global production 
networks appears to depend on the stage in the life of the commodity cycle. 
 
Conclusion 
The contribution of this paper has been to unpack the mechanisms lead firms adopt to 
coordinate their supply chains in order to satisfy the demands of investors and ratings 
agencies in the context of financialization and to explore the territorial implications of 
financialized coordination. Lead firms utilize particular coordination mechanisms in 
managing their supply chain and in so doing they develop and oversee the principles of 
participation of suppliers in global markets. This paper has shown that procurement has 
become a key mechanism for lead firms to drive financialization agendas in supply chain 
relations. Lead firms increasingly utilize value based management principles, or formalistic 
metric based calculations in procurement processes as a mechanism for vetting or selecting 
between suppliers of goods and services. The universal language of value based management 
is imposed by corporate offices and leads to a rupture in relations with local suppliers, 
enabling lead firms to elevate cost based calculations in procurement. Financialization has 
therefore driven lead firms to adopt ‘hands-off’ forms of coordination of supply chains 
through a global approach to sourcing, which has prioritized standards or conventions, such 
as value based management and cost based calculations, resulting in ruptures in deeper and 
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longer term relations with local suppliers and the dis-embedding of lead firms from local 
territories.  
The mining industry has particular characteristics which limit the generalizability of 
the findings of this case to other industry sectors. Mining is a highly capital intensive and 
therefore intensely financialized industry rendering global mining firms particularly 
vulnerable to the proclivities of international financial markets. At the same time, the landed 
nature of extractive industries creates a strong connection between lead firms and territory, 
particularly in boom times in which rapid extraction of large volumes of resources becomes a 
primary driver of firm strategy. These characteristics of mining create a tension between the 
de-territorialization tendencies of global financial markets and the localization pressures 
associated with rapid resource extraction which vary across the boom bust cycle. Other 
industry sectors may reveal a more stable pattern of lead firm coordination of supply chains 
and its associated territorial implications in the context of financialization.  
This suggests opportunities for economic geographers to explore cross-sectoral 
variation in the effects of financialization on the territorial dimensions of lead firm 
coordination of global supply chains. For example, lead firms face different localization 
pressures in different industry sectors which include the imperative to organise and integrate 
global knowledge sources as evidenced by Big Pharma who have become embedded in 
global centres of excellence in biotechnology (Malecki 2010). The global search for talent 
and knowledge might operate as a localizing force against the de-territorializing effects of 
financialization. Cross-sectoral variations in these tensions might affect lead firm 
coordination of supply chains, including differences in procurement arrangements, and 
thereby the mechanisms through which financialization and de-territorialization unravel in 
particular contexts. 
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